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As both a regulator and academic, Fred Kahn argued that end-use electricity consumers should 
face prices that reflect the time-varying marginal costs of generating electricity. This has been 
very slow to happen in the U.S., even in light of recent technological advances that have lowered 
costs and improved functionality for meters and automated demand response technologies. We 
describe these recent developments and discuss the remaining barriers to the proliferation of 
time-varying electricity pricing. 
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Fred Kahn was a passionate advocate for using sound economic principles to determine prices 
for regulated services such as electricity. His magnum opus The Economics of Regulation: 
Principles and Institutions (Kahn, 1970) devotes several chapters to the application of marginal 
cost pricing principles to the design of rate structures for regulated services. As the Chairman of 
the New York Public Service Commission (1974-77) he endeavored to put his academic research 
into practice by initiating regulatory proceedings to reform electric utility rates to better reflect 
marginal cost pricing principles and more broadly to adopt regulatory policies that would 
increase the efficiency with which regulated services were supplied and priced. 
 Kahn’s interest in pursuing regulatory reforms to improve the efficiency of utility rate 
structures made him an active proponent of peak-load pricing for retail electricity consumers in 
the United States. He understood that more efficient prices would reduce peak demand, and the 
need to build enough capacity to meet it, and would lead to an overall increase in economic 
welfare. He also understood that there would be winners and losers from such pricing changes 
and examined less distortionary mechanisms than uniform pricing to cushion the adverse impacts 
on disadvantaged consumers (e.g. non-linear tariffs).  
 In his 1979 Ely Lecture to the American Economic Association, Kahn wrote:  
One of my proudest accomplishments…was the progress we made [as regulators] in 
requiring electric and telephone companies in New York to introduce marginal cost 
related prices. If you are a large residential user of electricity on Long Island, you will 
soon…pay rates varying between 2½ cents at night to 30 cents on summer days when the 
temperature gets above 83o” (Kahn, 1979, p. 2). 
I. PROGRESS ON PEAK LOAD PRICING OF ELECTRICITY IN THE U.S. 
  The idea of moving from time-invariant electricity prices to “peak-load” pricing, where 
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prices are more closely tied to variations in the marginal cost of generating electricity, has been 
around for at least fifty years (e.g. Boiteux, 1964; Kahn, 1970). The marginal cost of electricity 
varies widely over time because (a) the demand for electricity varies considerably; (b) it is 
uneconomical to store electricity in most applications; and (c) the optimal mix of generating 
capacity to balance supply and demand at all hours given (a) and (b) includes a combination of 
base load capacity with high construction costs and low marginal operating costs, intermediate 
capacity with lower construction costs but higher marginal operating costs, and peaking capacity 
with the lowest construction costs and the highest marginal operating costs. When demand is low 
it is cleared with base load capacity and as demand rises, generating capacity with higher 
marginal operating costs are called upon to balance supply and demand. In general, marginal 
costs are low at night and high during the day, low when temperatures are moderate and 
potentially very high when temperatures are either extremely high or extremely low, depending 
on the price of substitute fuels and the attributes of the appliance stock in a region. 
If end-use consumers face retail prices that do not reflect these variations in marginal 
generation costs, they will consume too much when marginal costs are higher than retail rates, 
likely during peak periods, and too little when marginal costs are lower than retail rates, likely 
during off-peak periods. Distortions in consumption lead to distorted investment in and 
utilization of generating capacity. 
In regions with deregulated wholesale electricity markets, power prices reflect 
differences in marginal costs as well as time-varying differences in firms’ abilities to push prices 
above marginal costs by exercising market power. In this context, moving end-use customers to 
time-varying prices can also reduce firms’ incentives and ability to exercise market power by 
increasing the elasticity of their residual demand (Borenstein and Holland, 2005). 
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Until fairly recently, the application of marginal cost pricing principles to electricity had 
been limited to a few countries in Europe (Mitchel, Manning and Acton, 1978), to larger 
customers for whom the costs of metering and data processing were thought to be relatively low 
compared to potential efficiency gains, and to a small number of pilot programs designed to 
measure consumer responses. So, despite Kahn’s efforts as a teacher, scholar, and U.S. regulator, 
the diffusion of time-varying electricity pricing arrangements has been especially slow in the 
U.S. A 2010 survey conducted by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC 2011, pp. 
28, 99) indicated that only about one percent of residential consumers are billed based on time-
of-use rates and only a handful of utilities offered “dynamic” pricing, where rates vary with real 
time or close to real time changes in marginal costs. Accordingly, almost all residential and small 
commercial consumers in the U.S. buy electricity on rate structures that do not vary with changes 
in overall supply and demand conditions, marginal costs or wholesale market prices from either 
an ex ante or real time perspective. 
II. OPPORTUNITIES AND PRESSURES TO EXPAND DYNAMIC PRICING 
 Several developments over the last decade have elevated interest in dynamic pricing. 
First, the evolution of competitive wholesale markets for generation services, where spot prices 
change as frequently as every ten minutes, has made it clear that there are wide variations in 
prices that reflect changing supply and demand conditions. Retail prices could be based on these 
transparent wholesale market prices rather than on marginal cost estimates. The wholesale 
market prices for electricity also have made it clear that traditional time-of-use (TOU) pricing, 
which used prices set ex ante based on expected generating costs during a small number of 
different time periods, only very roughly reflected varying marginal costs as conceived by Kahn 
and other scholars. Wholesale spot prices are extraordinarily high during a relatively small 
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number of hours on hot summer days and vary relatively little during the rest of the days of the 
summer. If peak-load pricing simply established all summer week-days as a high price period ex 
ante based on expectations, as almost all early applications of peak-load pricing did, consumers 
would not face powerful incentives to consume less when the system was highly stressed and 
wholesale prices were extremely high. 
 The second set of developments is associated with communications and metering 
technology. Internet and wireless communications did not exist when Kahn promoted peak-load 
pricing in New York, but technologies for real-time two-way communications between 
consumers and central data collection locations are now widely available. Further, technological 
progress continues to drive down costs and increase functionality for communications, as well as 
data storage, processing and acquisition. “Smart meters” (AMI) send real-time consumption data 
to the utility and enable various forms of dynamic pricing. Smart meters and associated 
communications and data acquisition and processing technologies also allow the utility, the 
consumer or third parties, to send signals back to the customer’s home or business to respond to 
price signals by controlling energy use (e.g. turning the air conditioning down), which can 
reduce peak demands when wholesale prices are high. 
Finally, at the federal level and in a growing number of states, policymakers are 
promoting a more modern and automated electric power network (Joskow, 2012, MIT, 2011). 
The federal government has provided significant incentives for utilities to adopt “smart grid” 
policies, including smart meters and variations on real-time pricing. The American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA) provided about $5.0 billion for smart grid demonstration and 
technology deployment projects http://www.smartgrid.gov/federal_initiatives (November 29, 
2011). About 130 projects have been funded under these ARRA programs with about $5.0 billon 
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of matching funds from utilities and their customers. A large fraction of the funds awarded by 
the DOE from its ARRA smart grid subsidy program are for smart meters, supporting IT and 
billing software, communications capabilities, and other distribution network enhancements to 
take advantage of  smart meter capabilities (http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/overview, 
November 29, 2011). The DOE funds have also supported several randomized control trials 
involving smart meters and variations on real-time pricing, including simpler “critical peak 
period” real-time pricing mechanisms 
(http://www.smartgrid.gov/recovery_act/program_impacts/consumer_behavior_studies). 
Twenty-five states have adopted smart metering policies varying from pilot programs to 
mandates that smart meters be installed in all homes over a period of time 
(http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=20672). It is estimated that over 20 million smart meters had been 
installed at residential and small commercial locations at the end of 2011, though real time 
pricing has diffused much more slowly than have smart meters 
(http://www.edisonfoundation.net/iee/issueBriefs/SmartMeter_Rollouts_0911.pdf). 
The interest in automating the local distribution grid with these new technologies has 
been stimulated by two additional factors. First, many portions of the U.S. electricity 
infrastructure, especially the lower voltage distribution network, are aging and need to be 
replaced. If long-lived replacement investments are made, there are good arguments to invest in 
cutting-edge technologies such as smart meters. Second, the federal government and about 30 
states have adopted policies to promote renewable energy technologies in an effort to reduce CO2 
emissions. Wind and solar technologies have received the bulk of federal support and interest 
from the states. While many of these technologies are connected to the high voltage network, 
solar photovoltaic (PV) technology is being promoted as a distributed generation source located 
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on customer premises or in small “farms” and connected to the local distribution system. The 
output from PV systems varies widely with insolation conditions, and the economic value of this 
kind of “intermittent” generations varies from hour to hour as market prices change. Smart 
meters and dynamic pricing will promote efficient use of PV technology and efficient use of new 
demand-side technologies, such as electric vehicle charging. 
III. UNRESOLVED ISSUES 
 Given the interest in dynamic pricing, it is useful to consider why it has not been adopted 
more widely. The historical arguments against introducing dynamic pricing were that (a) 
metering would be too costly for residential and small commercial customers given the potential 
for reducing deadweight losses, (b) meter reading and billing costs would increase with more 
complex rates, (c) retail consumers would not understand or effectively utilize complex rate 
designs, and (d) changing rate designs would lead to large redistributions of income reflecting 
the wide variations in consumption patterns across individuals. 
 The first two arguments appear largely irrelevant given current metering and billing 
technologies. Smart meters have certainly become technically and potentially economically 
attractive devices that, in addition to facilitating dynamic pricing, can significantly reduce meter 
reading costs, provide two-way communications capabilities and a wide range of other 
functionalities that can enhance information about demands and outages on the distribution grid, 
and use real time communications and control capabilities to help to manage new remote “smart” 
monitoring and control capabilities being installed on distribution networks. 
 In terms of customer response to time-varying pricing, there has been evidence dating 
back to the 1970s from well-designed TOU experiments and experience in other countries that 
consumers respond more or less as expected to price incentives (Aigner, 1985), suggesting that at 
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least for a fraction of residential consumers the benefits of TOU rates exceed their costs 
(Mitchell and Acton, 1980). Results from more recent pilot programs suggest that consumers 
similarly understand and respond to critical-peak pricing programs (e.g., Faruqui and Sergici, 
2010; Wolak 2010). Existing studies have focused on consumers who voluntarily participate in 
dynamic pricing programs, so care must be taken before extrapolating to the entire population. 
Armed with estimates of likely customer responses as well as engineering estimates of 
the costs of smart meter roll-outs, Faruqui, Mitarotonda, Wood, Cooper and Schwartz (2011) 
perform cost-benefit analyses of smart meters for several prototypical utilities. Their estimates 
suggest that savings derived from lower meter-reading costs and increased ability to detect 
outages will cover at least one-third and for some utilities as much as 80 percent of the direct 
costs of installing smart meters. They simulate customer benefits by modeling several categories 
of consumers with different levels of awareness of and responsiveness to prices as well as 
different uses for electricity (e.g., space conditioning versus electric vehicle charging). While the 
benefits outweigh the costs for each of the modeled utilities, a large share of the benefits accrues 
to a small number of consumers who are very responsive and own electric vehicles. 
 While some customers will likely benefit from dynamic pricing, other customers will see 
higher bills. The fear of large redistributions across customers is possibly the largest impediment 
to further adoption of dynamic pricing. Under flat-rate pricing, customers whose demand is 
relatively constant across hours are subsidizing customers whose demand is “peakier,” i.e., who 
consume a greater share of their energy at times when wholesale prices are the highest. If those 
customers do not change their consumption patterns under dynamic pricing, their bills may go up 
considerably. Borenstein (2007) analyzes customer-level billing data for almost 1200 
commercial and industrial consumers in Northern California and finds large redistribution from 
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switching from flat-rate to real-time pricing, although most of the redistribution happens when 
utilities replace flat-rate pricing with simple time-of-use rates. Using similar data from the 
residential sector, Borenstein (2011) shows that most customers would benefit from critical peak 
pricing and low-income households would not be systematically hurt by it. A small share of 
customers could see greater than 20 percent bill increases. Recent experiences suggest that the 
press and consumer advocates will focus attention on consumers who are hit adversely by the 
change. Accordingly, more research is needed to better understand the attributes of winners and 
losers in additional areas of the country to encompass a full range of demand and rate design 
characteristics. 
Redistribution effects may be tempered if customers with peaky demand respond to time-
differentiated prices and cut their peak-period use. Most existing studies on price responsiveness 
have focused on demonstrating that the average demand elasticity is non-zero and less on 
understanding heterogeneity across customers. Wolak (2010) finds that low-income consumers’ 
are more responsive than higher income consumers. As the two-way capabilities of smart meters 
are developed further and the set of home-energy management tools expands, it becomes easier 
for customers to respond, although there is no guarantee that customers likely to be hurt the most 
by dynamic pricing will take advantage of these options. 
It is most likely that dynamic pricing programs will evolve slowly, and that most utilities 
will begin by allowing volunteers to opt on to alternatives tariffs while leaving flat-rate pricing 
the default option. Borenstein (2011) analyzes the impacts of allowing fewer than 20 percent of 
the customers to opt on to dynamic pricing. If customers whose demand is already flat are most 
likely to move away from flat rates, the cost of serving the households who remain on flat rates 
increases, since they will on average consume more during expensive peak periods. Borenstein 
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(2011) finds that this effect is likely to be small. He does not model the offsetting effect, which is 
that as the first set of customers opt on to dynamic pricing and reduce their peak-period 
consumption, average prices fall, as do differences between peak and off-peak wholesale prices 
(Borenstein and Holland, 2005). This second effect suggests that the efficiency gains from 
forcing the remaining, unwilling customers onto dynamic pricing are smaller than the gains as 
the first customers move off flat-rate pricing. Particularly if mandatory changes face strong 
political opposition, this may not be a fight worth having. 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Fred Kahn strove to apply sound economic principles to important public policy 
decisions. One of his many contributions highlights the benefits of dynamic pricing. Many 
industries have taken advantage of the ability to amass and analyze real-time information about 
variations in supply and demand conditions and have used it to adopt sophisticated pricing 
strategies. Though recent technological advances have dramatically lowered the costs and 
expanded the capabilities of doing this in electricity, very few U.S. residential customers even 
have the option to pay dynamic prices. 
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